273 BC

In 273 BC Ptolemy II of Egypt established diplomatic relations and friendship with Rome. (The Navies of Rome, by Michael Pitassi)

"The reputation of the Romans beginning now to spread through foreign nations by the war they had maintained for six years against Pyrrhus, whom at length they compelled to retire from Italy, and return ignominiously to Epirus, Ptolemy Philadelphus sent ambassadors to desire their friendship; and the Romans were charmed to find it solicited by so great a king." -- Rollin. 4 The following year the Romans sent to Egypt four ambassadors in return for this courtesy from Philadelphus. (1898 ATJ, GEP 220.1)

Rome's Defeat of Pyrrhus was a clear declaration to the rest of the ancient Mediterranean world that the Romans had arrived on the world scene of warfare and power politics, and recognition of this fact was no long time in coming. In 273B.C. King Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt send ambassadors to Rome to open up friendly diplomatic relations with the victor of Italy. The Romans reciprocated by sending their own ambassadors to Egypt: Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges, N. Fabius Pictor, and Q. Ogulnius Gallus.... This delegation to Egypt, however, must have been headed by Gurges, who had been twice consul, censor, triumphator, and was perhaps the princeps senatus at the time of the embassy.

The Pyrrhic War finally came to an end in 272 BC. when Tarentum surrendered to Rome and joined many other Italian states in becoming a Roman ally. A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War; by Gary Forsythe

North and South:

319/318 BC -> Pyrrhus born

Dan 8:5 And as I was considering, behold, an he goat came from the west on the face of the whole earth, and touched not the ground: and the goat had a notable horn between his eyes.

Dan 8:6 And he came to the ram that had two horns, which I had seen standing before the river, and ran unto him in the fury of his power.

Dan 8:7 And I saw him come close unto the ram, and he was moved with choler against him, and smote the ram, and brake his two horns: and there was no power in the ram to stand before him, but he cast him down to the ground, and stamped upon him: and there was none that could deliver the ram out of his hand.

Dan 8:8 Therefore the he goat waxed very great: and when he was strong, the great horn was broken; and for it came up four notable ones toward the four winds of heaven.

1. Cassander
2. Ptolemy
3. Lysimachus
4. Seleucus.

Alexander the Great died in 323 BC. At his death the kingdom was divided between dozens of generals. There wasn't 4 until 301 BC. And then in 297 BC, Cassander dies.
4 Diadochi or Successor Wars — by which 4 generals gain control over Alexander’s Empire — for 4 years. Pyrrhus was born 4 years after the death of Alexander in late 319/318.

Antigonus had for some years been the strongest general of Alexander’s, and in the 3rd Diadochi war, the combined effort of the other 4 couldn’t conquer him. He was determined to unite Alexander’s empire under himself. In 307 Antigonus begins the 4th Diadochi War.

Athens has been ruled by a dictator for 10 years. Cassander placed this dictator in power in 317BC, and in 307, Antigonus son, Demetrius, frees Athens. This broke a treaty between our generals and Antigonus that had been signed in 311.

303 => Pyrrhus forms an alliance with Demetrius

317  307  303  301

The 4th Diadochi war culminates in 301 BC.

He presented Demetrius to the army and declared him his successor; and what everyone thought stranger than all was that he now conferred alone in his tent with Demetrius; whereas in former time he had never entered into any secret consultations even with him; but had always followed his own advice, made his resolutions, and then given out his commands. Once when Demetrius was a boy and asked him how soon the army would move, he is said to have answered him sharply, ‘Are you afraid lest you, of all the army, should not hear the trumpet?’ Plutarch

Cassander vs. Antigonus / Demetrius

Briefly before battle was joined, unexpectedly Seleucus appeared on the scene and joined Lysimachus and Cassander, together with his son Antiochus and a large army and four hundred war elephants. This changed the entire situation. Plutarch offers some numbers, but they appear to be inflated. Still, it seems reasonably certain that after Seleucus’ arrival, the armies were near equal in size.

The battle started when Demetrius, commanding Antigonus’ cavalry, attacked Seleucus’ son Antiochus and drove him from the battlefield. At the same time, Antigonus the One-Eyed,
commanding the phalanx, came to grips with the infantry of the allies. Because Demetrius was away, Antigonus’ flank was now unprotected, and when Seleucus threatened to attack this wing, a part of Antigonus’ soldiers surrendered. Still, Antigonus expected to be saved by his son, but when Demetrius tried to return to the battlefield, he found his way blocked by Seleucus’ elephants. According to Plutarch, Antigonus was killed by a hail of spears, which suggests that he was killed by light infantry. Understanding that everything was lost, Demetrius retreated with a small army. Diodorus adds that Antigonus received a royal burial.

Livius.org (battle of Ipsus)

Pyrrhus fought bravely, but ultimately, the five hundred war elephants of Seleucus won the battle. Antigonus was killed in action and his son had to flee. However, Demetrius still possessed a large navy and had garrisons in the cities of Greece, where Pyrrhus may briefly have served as one of the governors of his brother-in-law. But not for a long time. In the negotiations that started after the battle of Ipsus, Demetrius agreed to hand over to his opponent Ptolemy of Egypt his wife's brother as a hostage. In Antiquity, this was a very common diplomatic practice: hostages ensured that the opposing sides would keep their promises. Livius.org, Articles on Ancient History; Pyrrhus of Epirus

Cassander died in 297 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Philip, who himself soon died, leaving two brothers, Antipater and Alexander, to contend for the kingdom. Antipater, the elder, murdered his mother because she favored his brother for the crown. Alexander called to his aid Pyrrhus king of Epirus, and Demetrius, who had again been deprived of all his eastern possessions, and was in Greece besieging its cities. Pyrrhus established Alexander in the kingship, reconciled Antipater, and returned to his own dominion before Demetrius arrived in Macedonia (294 B.C.). When Demetrius did arrive, Alexander informed him that his services were not now needed. However, Demetrius lingered, and before long compassed the death of Alexander. Then, as the Macedonians would not have Antipater to be king, because he had so fouly murdered his mother, Demetrius persuaded them to accept himself as their king. Antipater fled into Thrace, where, soon afterward, he died, and Demetrius reigned seven years as king of Macedonia, 294-287 B.C. {1898 ATJ, GEP 201.1}

Antipater, the eldest son of Cassander, had killed his mother Thessalonica and expelled his brother Alexander. Alexander sent to Demetrius for succour, and implored likewise the assistance of Pyrrhus. Demetrius, having many affairs upon his hands could not presently comply: but Pyrrhus came and commanded as the reward of his services, the city of Nymphaea, and all the maritime coast of Macedonia, altogether with Ambracia, Acarnania, and Amphilochio, which were some of the countries that did not originally belong to the kingdom of Macedon. The young prince agreeing to these conditions, Pyrrhus possessed himself of these countries, and secured them with his garrisons; after which he went on conquering the rest for Alexander and driving Antipater before him....

Demetrius, however, was unwilling to lose such an opportunity of aggrandizement; he accordingly left Athens, and reached Macedonia towards the end of the year B.C. 294. He had not been there many days before he put Alexander to death, and thus became king of Macedonia. Between two such powerful neighbours and such restless spirits, as Demetrius and Pyrrhus, jealousies and contentions were sure to arise. Each was anxious for the dominions of the other, and the two former friends soon became the most deadly enemies. Deidamia, who might have acted as a mediator between her husband and her brother, was now dead.

By the time Demetrius himself reached Boeotia, however, they had been defeated by his son Antigonus, whom he had left in charge in Greece, and all except the Thebans had surrendered. Demetrius therefore set about besieging their city.
The siege of Thebes dragged on through the winter of 292/1 and in the following spring, as soon as the passes were clear, Pyrrhus of Epirus attempted a diversionary campaign. Probably following the most direct route from Ambracia through Athamania to Gomphi (near mod Mouzaki), he overran Thessaly, perhaps hoping thereby to drive a wedge between Demetrius and his base in Macedonia or even envisaging an advance into Macedonia itself. No details of the affair have survived, however, other than the fact that Demetrius quickly ejected Pyrrhus from Thessaly, where he now stationed 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry, no doubt along the western approaches. That done, he returned to Thebes. The siege dragged on in a long and hard-fought struggle.... When towards the end of 291, or even early in 290, Thebes fell at last, Demetrius treated it with compassionate leniency. A history of Macedonia: 336 -167 B.C. - p 220 - 221

One thing this first quarrel taught Demetrius, was that a combined attack of both Pyrrhus and Aetolia, would be disastrous to his hopes in the region. As yet, the two powers had not united, but he felt the need to strike first and secure himself in the region. You will find Aetolia in the bottom map, just below Epirus.

... A full-scale attack by the massed forces of Epirus and Aetolia was not something that Demetrius could contemplate with equanimity.

Demetrius’ march on the Hellespont and later events from 287 onwards indicate that he never fully abandoned his ambition to recover his father’s kingdom in Asia. In that context it was essential for him to be rid of the threat of a united attack by Pyrrhus and the Aetolians before turning east. But apart from that - and it would probably be wrong to see any action of Demetrius as part of a rational plan conceived in a long perspective - both foes were an obstacle to full control of central and southern Greece. It was Demetrius’ way to hold several possibilities in his mind simultaneously. So while he planned to move west against the Aegean - whether peaceful or military - by his new foundation about this time of Demetrias, a synoecism of the villages of the agnesian peninsula around a core consisting of Pagasae.

...In 289 Demetrius deliberately led his troops on a campaign against Aetolia and Epirus, ravaging both regions. The text reads as though Demetrius motive was caprice: he needed to occupy his army and at the same time he could add the loot to his coffers. But the picture is far more complex. Demetrius was retaliating against Pyrrhus of Epirus who had overran Thessaly shortly before, while he was engaged in the siege of Thebes, and, as for the Aetolians, he was engaged in a Sacred War to liberate Delphi from their control. In 290 he had ceremonially held the Pythian Games at Athens, denying the legitimacy of the Aetolian occupation, and a campaign into Aetolia was the natural sequel. The war would necessarily involve ravaging the land over a long term, as had happened late in 322 when Craterus and Antipater invaded Aetolia and forced the defenders into the mountains to suffer the privations of winter, and Demetrius duly left his lieutenant Pantauchus to continue the campaign. And, given the poverty of the region, the campaign would almost certainly make a loss; the profit from the ravaging would hardly pay an army over a prolonged period of fighting. Here the financial motive was certainly subsidiary. What mattered was to follow in the footsteps of Philip II: Demetrius intended to win a Sacred War and parade himself as the liberator of Delphi. The ravaging was of course a means to the end, but not an end in itself.

In terms of military and territorial expansion Demetrius six-year rule of Macedon should be judged a considerable success. He soon regained the dominance in southern Greece that he had enjoyed in 302, annexing Thessaly and crushing two successive revolts in Boeotia. He took advantage of Lysimachus disastrous war beyond the Danube to invade Thrace, and, though he was recalled by the Boeotian rebellion, he forced his rival to cede the eastern part of Macedonia to him. He was also effective in curbing the territorial ambitions of Pyrrhus. In 291 he chased him out of Thessaly without a battle; in 289 he invaded and ravaged Epirus.
while Pyrrhus was occupied in Aetolia. In the aftermath, when Demetrius was seriously ill at Pella and Pyrrhus drove into Upper Macedonia as far as Edessa, he rose from his sick bed and routed him. The Eagle of Epirus turned tail and lost a considerable part of his army under the Macedonian attack. He was forced to come to terms with Demetrius. By this stage the Besieger had virtually achieved the eminence that Philip II had enjoyed after Chaeronea. Southern Greece was under his domination; Macedonia was united under his rule and he could turn his attentions to external conquest. There is no doubt that he was preparing a vast armament to rival Alexander’s last plans. He was building a fleet of some 500 warships, and had amassed a coalition army over 100,000 strong. Those are Plutarch’s figures, perhaps exaggerated, but even with exaggeration they dwarf the army Alexander led into Asia.

It was precisely at this apex of power and success that Demetrius lost his kingship, when his Macedonian troops deserted him in favour of Pyrrhus. This was superficially a paradox. Pyrrhus had no army that could match Demetrius forces, and he had never seriously engaged Demetrius in pitched battle. For all his interest in stressing Pyrrhus’ military brilliance, Plutarch cannot hide the fact that Pyrrhus twice withdrew precipitately rather than fight it out with the Besieger, and was forced to conclude peace. The Aetolian campaign of 289 will have temporarily enhanced his prestige. Then he had launched a counter-invasion of Aetolia, and defeated Demetrius’ lieutenant, Pantauchus. More importantly he responded to a challenge by the enemy leader and worsted him in a single combat, which Plutarch describes in Homeric terms. The result was that the Epirote army defeated the Macedonian phalanx and captured some 5,000 of them. This was undoubtedly a significant achievement, even though it was short-lived. Pyrrhus was soon forced to make peace with Demetrius, as in their turn did the Aetolians.

Pyrrhus’ behaviour significantly recalled that of Alexander. Exposure of one’s person was expected of the royal commanders, and the defeat of one’s adversary in single combat was the ultimate proof of prowess. Ptolemy made sure that his readers did not miss an engagement in Bajaur when he personally killed the leader of the opposing force of Indiance and stripped his body. It was something that Alexander himself never achieved, for all his desperation to capture Darius, and it was one of the few facets of his career that could be surpassed. According to Plutarch Pyrrhus’ exploit favourably impressed the Macedonians of Demetrius, who allegedly saw in him a reflection of Alexander in action, whereas other dynasts imitated Alexander only in their regalia and outward mannerisms. The main contrast is with Demetrius, who is represented as Pyrrhus’ polar opposite, the triumph of show over substance. There is undoubtedly some distortion here. Plutarch is, as always, conscious of the parallel with Antony, who was prone to masquerade and owed his victories mostly to his subordinates, and he makes the most of the pomp and circumstance that surrounded Demetrius. But Demetrius shared most of the characteristics of Pyrrhus. On Plutarch’s own account he led from the front during his numerous sieges, and suffered two serious wounds from the enemy artillery. In battle he was as unsparing of his person as Pyrrhus. Diodorus gives a memorable picture of his actions at the Battle of Salamis, where he fought a single combat on the stern of his flagship against a massed onset of enemy boarders; his three shield-bearers were killed or wounded but he continued the fight at close range. This evokes Alexander at the Malli town or Ptolemy at the Camels’ Fort, the commander giving a moral example at the epicentre of the fighting. The same had occurred at Gaza, when like Ptolemy and Seleucus he had exposed himself at the front of the fighting and fought until there was practically no one with him. It happened at Ipsus too, when his pursuit of his counterpart, Antiochus, led to disaster. Significantly this is the feat of arms that Plutarch chooses to describe, since it fits the negative picture of Demetrius; the more responsible behaviour at Gaza and Salamis is passed over. Plutarch also makes much of Demetrius’ regal pomp, and the resentment aroused by his luxury and exhibitionism. Some of this is probably exaggerated to draw the parallel with Antony, who extravagant and ostentation is repeatedly
stressed. Indeed a degree of stateliness was expected in a king. Alexander had given an
unforgettable display of regal glory in his last years… *The Legacy of Alexander: Politics,
Warfare, and Propaganda Under the Successors* – by A.B. Bosworth, Professor of Classics
and Ancient History

**MILITARY BUILD-UP AND DEFEAT OF DEMETRIUS - 287 BC**

Demetrius, characteristically, already had his eyes elsewhere and was busy building up a
large army and navy for a campaign in Asia Minor, evidently in the hope of restoring the
Antigonid empire in the East. With this in mind he had already assembled 98,000 infantry and
12,000 cavalry and laid down the keels for 500 ships at the Piraeus, Corinth, Chalcis, and
Pella... This vast military and naval programme is reflected in the increasingly large issues of
coinage by various Macedonian and Greek mints under Demetrius control throughout these
years... These various coinages reveal very clearly the size of the military and naval effort
Demetrius was making at this time, the threat which it must have presented to his enemies,
and the burden of taxation which it will have laid on the inhabitants of his empire.

News of what was afoot soon reached the other kings and spread general alarm. Recalling
his father's ambitions, they were apprehensive at the menace which Demetrius in his turn
represented, now that he controlled Macedonia and at least part of Greece. Sometime in
288, therefore, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus made an alliance against him and sent a
joint embassy to Pyrrhus urging him to ignore his agreement with Demetrius and to attack
Macedonia. Plutarch speaks of a series of letters to Pyrrhus, which implies negotiations, but
he does not record what Pyrrhus was offered. It seems likely, however, that he was
demanded, and was granted Macedonia, for he was clearly taken aback by Lysimachus' later
claim that the kingdom should be divided and, even though he gave way to this, he
succeeded in keeping the larger share. The agreement was followed by joint action. In the
spring of 287 Ptolemy sent a fleet into Greek waters to stir up revolt against Demetrius -
especially, as events were to show, at Athens. The Cyclades were taken under Ptolemaic
control and the island of Andros, which furnished a convenient base for action on the
mainland, was seized and garrisoned. From Thrace Lysimachus invaded Macedonia and
captured Amphipolis with the help of supporters within the city, while Pyrrhus, ignoring his
pact with Demetrius, came in shortly afterwards from the west, probably via metsovo,
Grevena, and Kozani, and from there advanced directly on Beroea, whence he ravaged the
country widely.

In those seven years Demetrius built up an army of one hundred thousand men, and a fleet of
five hundred galleys. At this, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Seleucus became alarmed, and set
about to check his further progress. They secured the alliance of Pyrrhus, whose dominions
bordered Macedonia on the west, and who, of course, could not consider himself safe in the
presence of Demetrius in possession of such an army as that. Lysimachus invaded
Macedonia from the east, and Pyrrhus from the west. The troops of Demetrius all deserted
him and joined Pyrrhus. Demetrius made his escape in disguise; and Lysimachus and
Pyrrhus divided between them the dominion of Macedonia (287 B.C.) {ATJ, Great Empires of
Bible Prophecy, Chapter 13}

...This cavalier attitude extended to his Macedonian subjects, if there is any truth in the
famous story that he received written petitions while on a progress through pella and then
emptied them into the river Axios in full view of his petitioners. If the king defaulted on his side
of the implicit contract, his subjects might well do the same. Accordingly when Demetrius
face a twofold invasion at the hands of Pyrrhus and Lysimachus, he found his troops
They began to desert to Lysimachus, so he withdrew to meet Pyrrhus, who was a non-Macedonian and had never who was a non-Macedonian and had never previously held his ground against Demetrius. The result was more desertion, in increasingly larger numbers, until Demetrius was totally abandoned. According to Plutarch he was told to take himself elsewhere, because the Macedonians had had enough of war fought simply to support his own luxury. The disillusion was profound. Unlike Alexander Demetrius had monopolized the spoils of his campaigns – or so his subjects thought. The planned invasion of Asia, for all the size of the armament, would not bring any ultimate return to the fighting men even if Demetrius managed to restore his father’s empire. This may have been a false perception, but it was certainly the prevailing view in Macedon, and Demetrius was deserted by his troops en masse. It cost him the kingdom of Macedonia, although he continue to act and be recognized as king, even without any territory to speak of. *The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda Under the Successors* – by A.B. Bosworth, Professor of Classics and Ancient History

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**THE KINGDOM DIVIDED AND THE COLD WAR - 287 TO 285 BC**

Lysimachus soon succeeded in sowing such distrust among the soldiers who had lately gone over from Demetrius to Pyrrhus, that they now went over from Pyrrhus to Lysimachus. This so weakened Pyrrhus that, rather than to contend against the power of Lysimachus, he with his own Epirotes and original allies retired to his own country of Epirus. This left the whole of Macedonia to Lysimachus, who formally took possession of it and added it to his dominions. *(1898 ATJ, GEP 201.2)*

But at last, after Demetrius had been wholly overthrown in Syria, Lysimachus, who now felt himself secure, and had nothing on his hands, at once set out against Pyrrhus. 6 Pyrrhus was in camp at Edessa, where Lysimachus fell upon his provision trains and mastered them, thus bringing him to straits; then, by letters and conferences he corrupted the leading Macedonians, upbraiding them because they had chosen as lord and master a man who was a foreigner, whose ancestors had always been subject to Macedonia, and were thrusting the friends and familiaris of Alexander out of the country. 7 After many had thus been won over, Pyrrhus took alarm and departed with his Epirotes and allied forces, thus losing Macedonia precisely as he got it. *(Plutarch - Life of Pyrrhus)*

…Lysimachus at once followed up his tactical advantage with a propaganda campaign among the leading Macedonians in which he played upon their nationalistic feelings of superiority to their Epirote king. *A history of Macedonia: 336 -167 B.C. - p 235*